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_9124553 _aPortela, Clara |
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_aSlow-acting tools _b: Evaluating EU sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine _cClara Portela, Janis Kluge _h[Recurso electrónico] |
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_aParís _b : European Union Institute for Security Studies _c , 2022 |
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| 300 | _a8 p. | ||
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_aBrief _v11 |
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| 504 | _aBibliografía: p. 7-8 | ||
| 520 | _aWithin the toolbox of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), sanctions have indisputably become the instrument of choice. Even before the invasion of Ukraine started on 24 February 2022, observers highlighted that most CFSP decisions concerned the imposition, renewal or updating of sanctions. Because of their versatility, Brussels employs sanctions to respond to a vast array of foreign policy challenges: democratic backsliding, human rights violations, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the misappropriation of state assets, and even human trafficking. As with all controversial tools, sanctions are subject to great scrutiny, and their usefulness is ultimately judged against their performance. In addition to denouncing their negative impact on the population, detractors typically highlight their lack of effectiveness. But how do we know whether and when sanctions are effective? | ||
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_aUnión Europea _2 _952895 |
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_aSanción económica _2 |
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_aPolítica exterior _2 |
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| 650 | 0 | _aConflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania | |
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_aGuerra _2 |
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_aRusia _9115522 |
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_aUcrania _9115932 |
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_uhttps://mpr.bage.es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=7c6ec71db9177d76f54c71fe2499edd7 _yDESCARGAR DOCUMENTO |
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