000			01882nam a2200253 i 4500
001			205307
003			ES-MaBCM
005			20231107062614.0
008			170511t2017 us||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a978-0-19-060086-0
021			_axx
035			_a(OCoLC)1365186630
040			_cES-MaBCM
100	1		_aJones, Seth G. _974360
245	1	0	_aWaging insurgent warfare _b: lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State _cSeth G. Jones
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c2017
300			_aIX, 336 p. _bil., gráf., mapas _c25 cm
500			_aÍndice analítico
504			_aBibliografía: p. 255-311
520			_aMost recent books on insurgencies have concentrated on how to counter them. Jones turns this around by instead asking what it takes for an insurgency to succeed. This allows him to look at recent conflicts, including those in Kosovo and Libya, in which Western powers supported insurgents. He combines quantitative data with careful observations to craft a thoughtful, original, and comprehensive analysis of how insurgencies start; the strategies, tactics, and organizational approaches they adopt; and their need for foreign support. Not surprisingly, the most successful insurgents tend to be those who can challenge the state on its own terms by using conventional force with support from an external power. Guerrilla warfare is a less promising option, since it relies on exhausting one's enemies rather than defeating them. One slightly misleading element of Jones' analysis is the firm distinction he draws between some of the communist-inspired insurgencies of the Cold War era and the Islamist ones that have arisen since the early 1990s, which has the effect of obscuring the essentially anticolonial character of both kinds of movements.
650		7	_aViolencia _960625
650	2	7	_aGuerra _958846
942			_cBK _2udc
999			_c205307 _d205307