000			02151nam a2200289 i 4500
001			205306
003			ES-MaBCM
005			20230301080651.0
008			170511t2017 uk||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a978-1-138-94214-1
021			_axx
035			_a(OCoLC)1365210615
040			_cES-MaBCM
100	1		_9121199 _aWirtz, James J.
245	1	0	_aUnderstanding intelligence failure _b: warning, response and deterrence _cJames J. Wirtz
250			_a1ª ed.
260			_aLondon : _a; New York _bRoutledge, _c2017 _a; New York :
300			_aXVI, 157 p. ; _c24 cm
490	0		_aStudies in intelligence
500			_aÍndice analítico
504			_aIncluye referencias bibliográficas
520			_aThis collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence.
650	2	7	_aServicio secreto _960242
650	2	7	_aDefensa _958232
650	2	7	_aSeguridad pública _960209
942			_cBK _2udc
999			_c205306 _d205306