Vista normal Vista MARC Vista ISBD

Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain Central Bank preferences. Accountability trough independence?

Muscatelli, Anton

Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain Central Bank preferences. Accountability trough independence? Anton Muscatelli

Materias: Inflación Política monetaria Banco de Inglaterra Banco público

Hacer reserva
Imprimir
Citar
Agregar a su carrito (remover)
Guardar registro
BIBTEX Dublin Core MARCXML MARC (no-Unicode/MARC-8) MARC (Unicode/UTF-8) MARC (Unicode/UTF-8, Estándar) MODS (XML) RIS
Más búsquedas

Buscar este título en:
Otras Bibliotecas (WorldCat) Google Scholar Google Books

Catálogo Biblioteca Central

Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain Central Bank preferences. Accountability trough independence?