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How agents weaken their principals' incentives to control : the case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations

Delreux, Tom

How agents weaken their principals' incentives to control : the case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations Tom Delreux & Bart Kerremans

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Materias: Comisión Europea Acuerdo internacional

Encabezamiento secundario--Nombre personal: Kerremans, Bart

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How agents weaken their principals' incentives to control : the case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations